Uncertainty is a paradox. On one hand, it is a potent and powerful
force that motivates research, a need to know. The gratifying result
of research is evidence used to guide practice and policy.
On the other hand, uncertainty always remains after research
because of the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the real world.
So policy-makers and practitioners are (or ought to be) troubled
about inevitable residual doubt. Examples include what to
do
about climate change, what
body
mass index is ideal and whether to
test
for prostate cancer.
Why uncertainty remains
Research may help reduce uncertainty, but it can never provide
certainty. Research is an errorful process that peers into an obscure
reality.
Determining what is true is plagued by the
problem
of induction, which was recognised in antiquity by Pyrrhonian
sceptic
Sextus
Empiricus. As British philosopher
David
Hume explains,
it
is a mistake to infer “that instances of which we have had no
experience resemble those of which we have had experience”.
Research evidence may be useful, but it cannot deliver certainty.
Another British philosopher,
Charlie
Dunbar Broad, notes that inductive reasoning is the “glory of
science” and the “scandal of philosophy”.
In effect, concluding from one observation, or even many, what is
true may be wrong. Accordingly then, claims may simply be false
alarms.
Falsification was
Karl
Popper’s response to the induction problem. In his view, we can
disprove notions but can never prove anything. For instance, the
generalisation that all swans are white can never be proved, but it
can be disproved by the discovery of just one black swan.
The theory of falsification acknowledges that research findings
are never certain, but raises a new problem: many useful truths may
be missed as confirmation is not possible, and disconfirmation may
never be achieved.
Research is caught on the horns of a dilemma, between reporting
what may be a false alarm and and missing out on identifying an
important truth for lack of evidence.
Ultimately, none of this is very satisfying. Researchers, it
appears, cannot escape uncertainty.
How do we cope with uncertainty?
Uncertainty is an uncomfortable position for many people and will
generally give rise to varying levels of
uncertainty-related
anxiety. So how do we cope?
One approach is to deny the uncertainty, to act as if the eureka
moment is true. But overconfidence does not eliminate the uncertainty
as incorrect theories, conclusions and claims based on research often
reveal.
Sometimes even the most famous get it very wrong as Mario Livio
details in his book,
Brilliant
Blunders.
Another approach is to accept that there is doubt about what is
true, being careful to distinguish doubt from denial. The confusion
of the two is seen in the common use of the word sceptic as a denier
of the research, such as a
climate-change
sceptic.
But a sceptic in the philosophical sense of the word acknowledges
that what is true is uncertain. Scepticism is a factor that limits
confidence as revealed in the 18th-century British anthropologist and
philosopher Thomas Henry Huxley’s
definition
of agnosticism:
In matters of the intellect do not pretend that
conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable.
For instance, in any modelling of future weather – be it
tomorrow, next week or two decades hence – it must be acknowledged
that there is doubt about what will happen.
But a researcher expressing such a view about future climate
projections in the current environment is very likely to be howled
down by those who dogmatically divide the world into believers and
deniers.
Claiming evidence-based knowledge and uncertainty simultaneously
is a tough position for the researcher to hold, but arguably a very
important one. For this reason, epidemiologist and journalist
Elizabeth
Pisani and physician and writer
Michael
Crichton observe that while research feeds policy, there is much
danger when the two become entangled and, in particular, when
research becomes political.
Advocates for action can be especially intolerant of uncertainty
and may seek to simply dismiss it. An important role for researchers
is to stand up for uncertainty.
A good researcher will maintain a degree of scepticism, according
to the North American philosopher Pierre Le Morvan. He
describes
“the doubtful scientist” and “the humble scholar” as
prototypes of “healthy scepticism”.
The third option is resignation and despair. This, however, does
not solve the problem of uncertainty. Rather, it simply returns us to
the observation that uncertainty is unsettling for many.
Uncertainty
is unsettling. Research seeks truth but will
always falls short. The uncertainty that remains encourages humility
and discourages hubris among the advocates for action.
For researchers, uncertainty is a motivating force with an endless
supply. If research is never final and uncertainty always remains,
then one certainty is that there will always be plenty more work to
do.
original artwork @ CCA by Steven S. Holden
